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Abstract
This paper will focus on a particular provision in the Norwegian tax reform of 1992, the imputation of
capital income for self employed and small incorporated firms with active owners. A simple user cost
model is derived, and this model is used to discuss the impact on investment incentives that stems from
imputation of capital income. Within this framework, we discuss potential distortions that stem from
certain elements in the Norwegian tax code. The formalised approach allows us to focus more on the
assumptions underlying the analysis, and we show that the user cost of capital is dependent of the
discount rate. We also use our approach to calculate potential tax wedges. The calculations show that
the distortions can be quite large, under realistic assumptions.
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1. Introduction
In the previous 10 years many of the industrialised countries reformed their tax systems radically.
Norway had officially their tax reform in 1992, although the personal taxation was changed every
year from 1987. In 1992 the tax reform was primarily concerned with changes in corporate taxation
and the taxation of self employed.
A frequently discussed issue in the tax reform debate, was the so-called «imputation model». The
imputation model is a method for dividing income from business activity into a capital income part
and a personal income (or labour income) part. This income split applies for economic agents, that
are officially registered as self employed or owners of a corporation where one or several of them
work actively in the corporation. The income for these agents is a function of labour effort and capital
investment. Due to the fact that the total income from this kind of economic activity cannot be easily
divided into capital or labour income, and that these types of income are taxed with different tax
rates, the tax authorities must find a method for imputing the capital income or labour income. A
correct division of income must be considered important in Norway, due to the high difference in tax
rates on capital and labour income. The highest marginal tax rate for personal income is 52.4 percent
while the marginal rate for capital income is 28 percent.
The different aspects about the Norwegian imputation model have been discussed in a lot of articles.
Hansen et.al. (1991), Andersen and Sannarnes (1993, 1994a, 1994b) have all discussed different
consequences for investment incentives. Sarmarnes (1995) presents a portfolio model that focuses on
investment incentives and uncertainty. Fagerland (1993) presents different ways to organise the
activity under the presence of the imputation model. None of these paper have, however, presented an
explicit user cost model l . This paper will discuss different investment incentives using the user cost
apparatus as a tool. This paper should therefore be considered as a more compact discussion of the
different aspects around investment incentives when the capital income imputation model applies. A
formal model has at least two advantages over an informal approach. First, a normalisation forces us
to focus on the underlying assumptions in the analysis, compared to an informal approach. Second, a
formal approach will allow us to calculate tax wedges that can prevail. This property is important
because it illuminates the magnitude of distortions, which is not found with an informal approach.
The user cost model is an extended variant of the models developed by Bradford (1981) and
Boadway (1980). The extension is primarily that a two-rate tax system is introduced. Throughout the
Hansen et.al. (1991) presents some effective tax rates but the model used is not presented.
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paper we will mainly use the term self employed, although the tax system applies for both self
employed and for small incorporated firms with active owners. The ownership form will in general,
however, not influence our results beneath 2 .
The paper is organised as follows. The main provisions of the income tax system after 1992 for self
employed are described in section 2. The derivation of the model is done in section 3, and in section 4
we discuss how to achieve undistorted investment incentives. Section 5 discusses different provisions
in the Norwegian tax code and their impact on investment incentives. In Section 6 we focus on the
choice of the discount rate, and give examples of how this choice will change the cost of capital.
Section 7 gives some tax wedge calculations based on the user cost model. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Norwegian imputation model
The Norwegian tax system divides income according to source. Income from capital is taxed with a
flat tax rate. This is currently 28 percent Income from labour effort or personal income, is taxed with
a progressive tax rate. The lowest tax rate for personal income is 28 percent, thus the same rate
applies for personal and capital income, but the tax rate can be as high as 52.4 percent when personal
income is higher than approximately 250 000 kroner.
The main change for self employed compared to the tax system before the tax reform of 1992 was
the definition of the personal income tax base. Instead of allowing interest deductions in the personal
tax base, the total income for the self employed is divided in two parts. One part is classified as
capital return and this part is taxed at the flat tax rate for capital income. This part is estimated as a
capital return rate multiplied with the tangible capital that is used in the activity. The other part, total
income minus capital return, is taxed as personal income. The capital income imputation rate is equal
for all sorts of production, and it is intended to be equal to the market interest rate plus a risk
premium. In addition, if the self employed has employees, he/she can deduct a percentage of total
labour cost (wages) in the firm. We will not, however, discuss the wage deduction further in this
paper. It is useful to formalise a simple tax function for self employed and shareholders with similar
characteristics. For simplicity we consider one agent, this allows us to treat these two organisational
forms equally for tax purposes. Let n(k,l) denote the income. The income is a function of both capital
(k) and labour (/). Total income is taxed with a flat tax rate f. The part of total income that is
2 However, corporations with limited liability can in certain cases be curbed with regard to their use of income,
and these restrictions can influence on the user cost of capital. These cases are not considered in this paper. See
Kanniainen and Södersten (1995) for a discussion.
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classified as labour income is additionally taxed with a rate f. In reality tg is a function of income but
throughout the paper we will assume that tg is flat. This is, of course, a simplification. The personal
income tax rate is then equal to tc + tg and the total income will in this system be taxed progressively.
Depreciation allowances (pk), where p is a depreciation rate, are deducted from n(10), and the income
after depreciation is the base for the income split. Interest costs (rk) are deductible in the capital
income base, not in the personal income base. With this specification of the interest deduction we are
implicitly assuming that interest on both equity and debt are deductible. This assumption will be
discussed in section 6. We assume that the imputation rate a is an estimate for the normal capital
return chosen by the tax authorities. Given this, and the definitions above, we can write the tax as
(1)	 = tc (n(10 - p k— rk) + tg (n(10) - pk -  a k)
where Ti denotes the imputed tax.
From equation (1) we see that depreciation allowances have an impact on both the capital and the
personal tax base, while the imputation has only an effect on the personal tax base. The major point
is, however, that an incorrect estimate of the capital income will give an progressive or regressive
taxation of capital. If such a case appears we can express this as «a not intended two rate capital
income tax system».
As mentioned above, it will be difficult to actually observe the economic correct capital return. This
is due to problems with measuring the economic values of k, p and a. If the estimated value of k is
different from the economic value the average tax will be incorrect, because both tax depreciation and
imputed capital return will differ from the economic value. If we look at a marginal increase in k, and
assume that the marginal increase can be valued correctly, the marginal tax will be correct if the
imputed marginal capital return (a) is equal to the net capital return and p is equal to economic
depreciation. Because this paper will focus on investment incentives, the problem of measuring the
economic value of k is irrelevant for our purposes as long we are able to measure a marginal increase
in k correctly.
3. A discussion of investment incentives
The user cost approach is a widely used concept in analysis of capital taxation. The popularity of this
concept is probably due to the fact that distorting effects of any tax system can be analysed with this
tool.
3
The point of departure is a partial equilibrium multi-period model. We assume that the agent runs a
profit-maximising price-taking corporation. The individual wants to allocate his wealth in a way that
maximises his utility. We assume that the individual can borrow or lend as much as he wants, at the
same interest rate, in the financial market. This means that we can concentrate on the investment
decision separately, well known as the Fisher separation theorem (Fisher(1930)). The tax rates
(tc and tg ) and the definition of the tax bases are assumed to be constant over time. To keep the
model simple we do not discuss the cost of finance i.e. personal taxation, we will solely focus on the
cost of capital. This assumption can to a certain degree be defended, because one of the main goals in
the Norwegian tax reform was to equate the cost of finance between different financing forms. In
section 6 this issue will be discussed in more detail. We also assume that price changes in capital
goods are zero.
Assume now that the individual wants to undertake a marginal real investment. In equilibrium we
know that the marginal investment cost must equal the present value of the income stream from thé
investment. The marginal real investment gives a gross return of nk (10). If we assume that the
marginal capital return can be found given the optimal input of labour, we can denote this return as c.
This means that we treat the marginal capital return separately, given the optimal use of labour. The
price on the marginal investment is set to q, thus treated as exogenous and assumed constant over
time. We assume that capital services from the marginal investment decay exponentially at a rate 8.
This means that a unit of age s capital is equal to e -8s new units of capital. The nominal capital return
at time s is then equal to cess.
In a world without taxes, which is our reference case, the equilibrium condition will be equal to
•(2)	 q =	 e4r1-8) sds
where r is the discount rate. As shown in Auerbach (1983) a direct formulation of the optimisation
problem as in equation (2), can also be solved by a more comprehensive dynamic programming
problem. Integration of (2) gives our familiar first order condition for optimal investment
(3)	 c = (r +8)q
The agent should invest until the marginal return to capital is equal to the interest plus depreciation.
An ever easier explanation of equation (3) is that the investor should invest until the net return per
krone invested (c/q - 8) is equal to r. If all corporations in an economy followed this investment
rule, production efficiency will be achieved, also called a Pareto-optimum in the production. If we
believe in such a rule, the goal for a tax system should be to not change this rule.
Let us consider the case where the imputation model applies. If we take the derivative of equation (1)
with respect to k we get:
= tc (c - —r) + tg (c _ p - a)
where c is the marginal capital return, i.e. c =nk(k,1). Equation (4) is the tax on a marginal
investment. To get the required return after tax for a marginal investment project we take the present
value of the marginal tax and subtract this from equation (2). This gives us the following
equilibrium condition
co 	 co 	 co
q = cer+8»cit —tc Ce -e+8)1 dt —tg ice -e+8)1 dt + q[tc e-e+P)1 dt + tc fre -fr+" dt
(5)	
0.0
+tg I pe -o+P» dt + tg fcce -04.1»dt]
where p is the payment path for interest deductions, and is the path for the deduction of the
imputed capital income.
The first three integrals on the right hand side represent the present value of the marginal return (c)
after tax. The fourth and the sixth integral is the present value of tax saving due to tax depreciation.
The fifth integral is the tax saving from interest deductibility and the seventh integral is the tax saving
from the imputed capital return. We have in general assumed that interest deductions and deductions
for imputed capital return follows different paths than tax depreciation deductions. We will discuss
possible paths for these deductions below.
(4) ar
ak
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Calculating the integrals gives us the following first order condition for the marginal investment.
(6)	 — =	 [r +80	 tg)1
	tcr(r +8 +  p —8) tgr  p —8 tga, r+81
q 1—tc —tg 	 r+E3 r+p	 r+p	 r+Ä,
From equation (6) we find that the potential distortions stem from four sources, accelerated
depreciation, the payment path of interest, imputation of capital income and the path for the capital
income imputation. Equation (6) allows us therefore to discuss several possibilities for undistorted
investment incentives when the Norwegian imputation model applies. The parameter values for (3, 2t, and
p can all be given important economic interpretations; their impact on the user cost of capital will
therefore be explored below.
4. Requirements for undistorted investment incentives
Result 1.
When p = X = p and a = r we do not have any distortions from the tax system on the marginal
investment.
The result is easily proved when we substitute a for r and 2 and p for p in equation (5). Interest
deductions that declines with p means that the interest deduction is given on the tax depreciated value of
the marginal investment.
Result (1) can at first glance seem surprising because it is valid for any tax depreciation i.e. it is valid in
the presence of accelerated depreciation (p # S ). The intuition behind this result is that the interest
deduction declines with the tax depreciation rate. The gain from accelerated depreciation is therefore
outweighed of the «loss» in the present value of interest deductions due to the fact that they decline with
the tax depreciation rate. A similar explanation can be given on the neutrality result that stems from the
equality between the imputation rate (a ) and the interest rate ( r ). An imputation rate equal to the
interest rate means that the tax base for personal tax and the capital income coincide. Given that the tax
bases declines along the same path, the tax system turns effectively into a one base tax system with
undistorted investment incentives as a result. This is actually a restatement of arguments given in for
instance, Sandmo (1974). If interest deductions are given for the full value of the marginal investment,
independent of the financing form, we will achieve undistorted investment incentives.
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In some cases one can imagine that interest deductions decline with the economic depreciation rate (8 ),
because this will be more in accordance with the development of gross return and hence « the ability to
pay the interest cost». If this is true we will get the following expression for the optimal investment
(7) 2-=r+6 	tcr
 [
p —8
i-tc-tg r + p
where we have assumed that a = r. This result tells us that accelerated depreciation will lower the user
cost of capital, and hence stimulate investment if the interest deduction declines with a rate lower than
the tax depreciation rate. The user cost will, on the other hand, be higher than the neutral value if
interest cost declines faster than tax depreciation.
Assume that f3 = X = p, which means that both interest deductions and capital income imputation
deductions follows the path of tax depreciation. Equation (5) can then be rewritten as
	 +NO t c) tg(oc +r) t
	
c	 g P —8 	all
— 
tg 	r + p
We can use equation (8) to explore the connection between accelerated depreciation and the capital
imputation rate. If accelerated depreciation exists and a # r we fmd that an increase in a can be divided
into two gross effects. First, a marginal increase in a will reduce the tax and the cost of capital with tg ,
because a of the marginal income is evaded from the high tax rate, tg . On the other hand we find that
for given accelerated depreciation an increase in a will reduce the value of accelerated depreciation
with tg (p-5). The reason for this second effect is that the deduction of imputed capital income reduces
the tax burden on personal income, that also indirectly reduce the gain from accelerated depreciation,
through the tax rate, f.
5. A discussion of some provisions in the Norwegian tax code
The model presented can be used to discuss some issues about the ca'pital income imputation model that
have been debated in the previous years. When the imputation model was implemented the government
allowed corporations to use different types of value assessment of the tangible capital that is used as the
base for the capital income imputation. A corporation could in general choose between tax value, book
value, a certain percentage of insurance value and several other alternatives. After 1995 a corporation
can only choose between tax value and book value. In our setting , X can be interpreted as the value
(8)
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assessment parameter. If is equal to p we know from result 1 that the capital income imputation
gives neutrality. This gives us result two;
Result 2.
Allowing corporations only to use the tax depreciated value as the base for capital income imputation
and interest cost payment entails neutral investment incentives.
The result is intuitive. When a = r and the deduction for the imputed capital return follows the same
path as tax depreciation (p), there will be no difference between the tax bases in any period. This means
that the tax system turns into a one base tax system with no distortions from the imputation as a
consequence. It is, however, important to understand the implications of interest deductibility. This
result will only hold if interest on both equity and debt are deductible, see for instance Sandmo (1974).
However, interest deductions are only given on the face value of debt which implies non-neutrality if
some of the marginal investment is fmanced by equity.
As pointed out above, corporations are allowed to use other valuation principles. If we assume that a
corporation uses book value assessment, the parameter 2t. is equal to S (given that book value equals
economic value) . Assuming that a is set equal to r we get two different expressions for the required
pre tax rate of return (user cost of capital).
a)
 3= 8
(9)	 —c = r +	 (tc +tg)r
 [
p —8 11—tc —tg r+p
b) 3 =p
tgr	 — ,(10)	 c—=r+8 	 p
tc tg r+p J
In case a) we fmd that the user cost of capital is reduced due to two effects. First, payment of interest
following the economic depreciation increases the present value of interest deductions compared to the
case where interest deductions follow the tax depreciation path. Second, using book value as the base for
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the capital imputation gives a similar increase in the present value of the capital income deduction. Both
effects reduces the effective taxation of capital income and distorts investment. In case b) only the
second effect will prevail because interest deductions follows the tax depreciation path. Case b) will
therefore distort investment incentives only through the capital imputation and give smaller distortions
than case a).
A way to achieve neutral investment incentives even when corporations are allowed to use different
paths to impute capital income is to connect different capital income imputation rates to the different
paths. If a corporation uses book value assessment, the tax authorities can connect a capital income
imputation rate equal to oc"K = a0+r)/(p+r)). Using a adjusted rate will give neutral investment
incentives even in the presence of different assessment of the capital return base.
6. The choice of the discount rate
Will the choice of the discount rate give different expressions for the user cost of capital? In the
above analysis r is chosen as the discount rate, and at the same time we deduct r from the base for
capital taxation. In some papers, however, it is common to use interest after tax as a discount rate and
at the same time not allow for deductions of interest costs in the tax base. Sandmo (1974), Boadway
(1980) uses the first approach while Bradford (1981) uses the other approach. As Blom (1988) points
out, these approaches are not equivalent. He does not, however, discuss this issue further. In this
section we will do an attempt to clarify the differences and the similarities between these two
approaches, and connect it to the above presented model.
The choice of the discount rate is in reality a function of finance structure of investments, the pay-out
policy and the personal and corporate tax rates. A starting point in deciding the correct discount rate
is to use the fundamental arbitrage condition for equilibrium in the capital market, see for instance
Goulder and Summers (1989).
(11)	 r (1 — m c(1 )(I — m) + (I — z)dV
V
where V is the value of the corporation, c is the gross pay out or dividends, m is the personal tax rate,
z is the capital gains tax rate and dV is the increase in the value of the corporation. For simplicity we
have neglected risk. Equation (11) tells us that the gain after tax from investing a krone in a
corporation should be equal to the gain after tax from bank saving. To compare our approach above
9
with this arbitrage approach we need to redefine some of the parameters in (11). Let the value of the
corporation (V) be equal to q. This means that we can consider the value of the corporation equal to
the value of the marginal investment. Assume further that we have no double taxation of the pay out
from the corporation (t = 0 ) and a zero capital gains tax ( z = 0 ). For easy comparison we will set
m equal to f , which is true in the Norwegian tax system after 1992. Under these assumptions we get
the following arbitrage condition
(12) ra —tc ) =	 —tc )+ dq 
In this setting we can interpret c as the cost of capital i.e. the required rate of return from a marginal
investment. Let us assume, for simplicity, that the increase in the price of capital goods is zero
(dq =0) and the investment price q is equal to 1. In addition we assume that the marginal investment
has an economic depreciation at a constant rate 8 in every period. This gives us the following
condition
(13) ra — tc ) =	 tc ) — 8
From equation (13) it is easy to see that if depreciation is deductible in the tax base, equation (12)
reduces to equation (3) for q =1. Equation (13) is therefore a suitable starting point for a discussion
of the discount rate in our analysis. Assume that the investment is financed by debt and that
economic depreciation and interest cost is deductible in the tax base. The net return after cost and
taxes from the marginal investment is c - 8 - r - f (c -
 6 - r). In equilibrium we have
(14) c - 8 — t c (c — 8 — r) = r
The left hand side is the net return after tax and this return must be high enough to cover the interest
expenses. It is also possible to interpret the left hand side in (13) as what you at least must require
from a marginal investment after tax to earn the gross interest rate. The left hand side is a required
income stream and this should therefore be discounted with r , the required return. The assumption in
this analysis that defends the use of r as a discount rate is that the marginal investment is fully
financed by debt, or that interest cost can be deducted for the full value of the marginal investment.
This means that the corporation can deduct interest from both debt and equity capital. The above
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analysis rests therefore on the rather strong assumption that the marginal investment is fully debt
financed or that the tax system does not discriminate against equity capital.
In many analysis about taxation it is common to assume that the marginal investment is financed by
equity (rententions), and no explicit treatment of interest deductions in the tax base. If f is the tax
rate on bank returns, it will in this case be proper to use r(1-t') as a discount rate. Using ra-t
instead of r as a discount rate will, however, not give the same cost of capital. To understand this we
can substitute r(1-f) for r in equation (5) and not deduct the interest cost in the base for the
corporate tax. Explicit integration and some calculations gives
(15) p -6 	  r+8)(1 tc ) + tg (a +r)
	 [(tc + tg) r(1 - tc) - tgal)
q 1-tc-e
	
- t9 + p
Equation (15) should be compared with equation (8). The difference between these equations is small
but significant. Especially the impact from the accelerated depreciation is different. From equation
(15) we find that accelerated depreciation will exist whenever the capital imputation rate a is
different from the discount rate r(1-tc), even when the personal tax rate tg is zero. From equation (8)
we find that we will not have any impact from accelerated depreciation through the capital income tax
rate tc, when interest costs are deductible and the payment follows the tax depreciation path. The
reason for the difference is that interest costs, following a tax depreciation path, cancels the increase
in the present value due to accelerated depreciation. This effect cannot be found in equation (15)
because we do not have any explicit treatment of interest expenses, i.e. that the cost of equity capital
is not deductible in the tax base. The implicit assumption in equation (15) is that payment of interest
cost declines with the economic depreciation rate, this increases the present value of interest
deductions that will give the self employed a gain from accelerated depreciation even when the
capital imputation rate is equal to the interest rate.
7. The imputation model and tax wedges. Some examples
A tax wedge is the difference between the required return before tax and the required return after tax.
If the wedge differs from zero, the tax system can be characterised as non-neutral. The size of the tax
wedge can give us an exact measure of the potential distortions and such calculations can therefore be
helpful, especially in political decision processes 3 .
3For more about the tax wedge literature, see King and Fullerton (1984) and Jorgensen and Yun (1989). Hagen
(1988), has made tax wedge calculations for the Norwegian tax system.
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Equation (6) in section 3 is the point of departure. We present two graphical illustrations where tg
varies from zero up to 24 percent, which is equal to the highest marginal tax rate on personal income
in Norway. In the first illustration (figure 1) tax depreciation rate is also varied. We assume that the
market interest rate and depreciation rate both are equal to 8 percent. The capital income tax rate (tc)
is set to 28 percent, equal to the actual capital income tax rate in Norway. We assume further that the
imputation rate is 8 percent. With these assumptions we find that the investment neutral required rate
of return is equal to 16 percent.
Figure 1 shows clearly that when tax depreciation equals economic depreciation the tax wedge will be
zero, for all tax rates. However, we will have distortions when the payment path of interest expenses
not follows the tax depreciation path, even when the personal tax rate (tg) is zero. For the highest
personal tax rate we find that distortions due to accelerated depreciation can raise or lower the
required rate of return with around +-5 percentage points.
Figure 1.	 Distortions due to accelerated depreciation under variable personal tax rate.
Figures in percent/100.
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Figure 2.	 Distortions due to difference between the capital imputation rate and the
discount rate. Figures in percent/100.
It may also be interesting to see how the required rate of return changes under variable imputation
rates. Figure 2 depicts the departure from neutrality when the imputation rate and the personal tax rate
are varied. To ease the interpretation of figure 2 we keep accelerated depreciation to zero. Other
assumptions are as before.
When tg is equal to zero, we have, of course, no distortion of the investment incentives. Figure 2
shows further that an imputation rate equal to the market interest also give investment neutrality, or
more correctly, an imputation rate equal to the discount rate gives no distortion. If the imputation rate
is lower than the market interest rate the required rate of return is higher compared to the investment
neutral case, and lower when the opposite prevails. The distortion is symmetric around the neutrality
path and increasing in tg. The maximum size of the tax wedge is in figure 2 equal to about 4
percentage points or about 25 percent of the neutral required rate of return.
It is also interesting to take a closer look at the potential distortions that can prevail when book value
is used as the base for the capital imputation deduction. As pointed out above, a capital income
imputation deduction following the tax depreciation path will not give any distortions. Figure 3
presents an example on the magnitude of distortions given that both economic depreciation and the
interest rate are set to 5 percent. We further assume that the personal tax rate (ig) is 24 percent, the
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Figure 3.
	 Distortions due to different paths between tax depreciation and capital
imputation deductions. Figures in percent/100.
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payment path for interest follows economic depreciation. Under these assumptions we will have
undistorted investment incentives when tax depreciation is 5 percent. This neutral case appears in
figure 3 when the «distortion» line crosses the x-axis.
The magnitude of the distortions can be quite substantial if the book depreciation rate differ much
from the tax depreciation rate. The cost of capital will be higher than the «neutral» level when tax
depreciation is less than economic depreciation and lower when the opposite prevails. When tax
depreciation is lower than economic depreciation, the present value of the capital imputation
deduction is lower when the economic depreciation path is used, compared to a case when tax
depreciation path is used. This raises the cost of capital above the «neutral» level. The opposite case
prevails when tax depreciation is higher than the economic depreciation. For instance, when tax
depreciation is 10 percent, the required rate of return is two percentage points lower when book value
is used compared to a case where tax value is used.
8. Concluding remarks
This paper have presented a simple user cost model that discusses some of the potential distortions that
can prevail when the Norwegian capital imputation model applies. The distortions are in general due to
two characteristics in the tax system. These are the definition of the deductions in every period and the
«payment path» of the deductions. The defmition, or the assessment of the different tax parameters,
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decides the magnitude of the «within period distortion». In our case the magnitude of the distortions are
the difference between capital imputation rate (a ) and the discount rate (r) and the difference between
the tax depreciation rate and the economic depreciation. The payment path distorts investment because
they have an impact on the present value of the deductions. Tax wedge calculations show that the
distortions can be quite large if the personal tax rate is high. However, compared to some of Hagen's
(1988) tax wedge calculations the potential distortions found in this paper must be considered as small.
This analysis rests, however, on a lot of more or less restrictive assumptions. First, risk is not considered.
Second, the fmancing of investment is taken as exogenous in the analysis. Third, the model is only of
partial equilibrium character. • We have to consider these assumptions as restricting, but it is more
interesting to ask if the results in this paper will change significantly if these assumptions had not been
made. It is, however, outside the scope of this paper to discuss these issues further.
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